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EMPLOYERS ARE NOT FRIENDS WITH
FACEBOOK: HOW THE NLRB IS
PROTECTING EMPLOYEES’ SOCIAL MEDIA
ACTIVITY
INTRODUCTION
Among the multitude of technological changes over the past few years
was the explosion of social media.1 Social media platforms like Facebook
and Twitter have grown so popular that they substantially influence
everyday life. 2 As of June 2012, Facebook had more than 995 million
monthly active users with over 550 million logging in every day, 3 and
Twitter had approximately 500 million registered users, whose exponential
growth sees 100 million users logging in each day.4 From the blockbuster
success of The Social Network5 to Facebook and Twitter’s contributions to
the Arab Spring revolutions,6 social media has already noticeably affected
society and continues to do so.7 Likewise, the workplace is not immune
from the influence of social media.
In November 2010, in what labor officials and lawyers view as a
“ground-breaking case,” 8 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
claimed that under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) it is
“protected activity” for an employee to criticize a supervisor on Facebook.9
The NLRA protects employees’ right to discuss “terms and conditions of
their employment with co-workers and others.”10 This case started what has
1. See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Social Media and Privacy in the Workplace, in 2 ALI-ABA
COURSEBOOK: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE OBAMA YEARS AT MIDTERM 2123, 2130 (2011).
2. See id.
3. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2012).
4. See Shea Bennett, Just How Big is Twitter in 2012?, ALL TWITTER (Feb. 23, 2012, 6:00
AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/twitter-statistics-2012_b18914; see Lauren Dugan,
Unofficial Reports Suggest Twitter Surpassed 500M Registered Users in June, ALL TWITTER
(July 31, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/twitter-500-million-registered
-users_b26104.
5. The Social Network is a movie about the creation of Facebook that received three Oscars.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2130.
6. See, e.g., Mike Giglio, Tunisia Protests: The Facebook Revolution, THE DAILY BEAST
(Jan. 15, 2011, 6:29 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/15/tunisa-protests-the
-facebook-revolution.html; Luke Allnutt, Tunisia: Can We Please Stop Talking About ‘Twitter
Revolutions’?, TANGLED WEB BLOG, http://www.rferl.org/content/tunisia_can_we_please_stop
_talking_about_twitter_revolutions/2277052.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011); Ari Melber, Can
Egypt’s Internet Movement be Exported?, THE NATION (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.thenation
.com/print/article/158717/can-egypts-internet-movement-be-exported.
7. See Giglio, supra note 6; Allnutt, supra note 6.
8. See Steven Greenhouse, Company Accused of Firing over Facebook Post, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/business/09facebook.html.
9. See id.
10. Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, NLRB (Feb. 8,
2011), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-case-involving-discharge-facebook
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become, and will likely continue to be, a pattern of charges filed by the
NLRB against employers that discipline employees for discussing
employment issues via social media.11
The “Facebook Firing” case—as the media has coined it 12 —and the
social media cases that have followed13 will likely have a profound impact
on the corporate world. As social media use remains prevalent and
widespread, employees will undoubtedly continue to use social media
platforms to express their feelings about supervisors, co-workers, and other
aspects of their jobs. In an effort to protect their reputation and
organizational culture, corporations will likely terminate many employees
for posting certain comments on social media websites. The Facebook
Firing case has shown that such employer action may have significant
consequences.14 But the NLRB’s inconsistent pattern of choosing to pursue
certain cases that followed the Facebook Firing case while refusing others
has created uncertainty as to when social media postings will be protected
and when they will not.15
In the near future, if not currently, all employers will need social media
policies for their employees, 16 but they must be careful when enforcing
those policies.17 On one hand, employers do not want to face the costs of
-comments.
11. See When Can Employers Fire You for Facebook, Twitter?, TECH AND TREND (Sept. 6,
2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/220171/20110926/facebook-twitter-national-labor
-relations-board.htm; see also Think You Can’t Fire over a Facebook Post? Think Again,
NOTATIONS ON NON-PROFITS (July 30, 2011), http://www.notationsonnonprofits.com/recent
-law/think-you-cant-fire-over-a-facebook-post-think-again/.
12. See Melanie Trottman, Facebook Firing Case is Settled, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704422204576130631738779412.html.
13. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011) (detailing a social media
case brought by the NLRB following the Facebook Firing case); Hispanics United of Buffalo,
Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011); Karl Knauz
Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 28, 2011);
N.L.R.B., MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING
SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OM 11-74] (on file with author).
14. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; see also Trottman, supra note 12 (discussing employer in
the Facebook Firing case settling privately with the employee on undisclosed terms, but forced to
rewrite its employee rules).
15. Compare Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437 (pursuing charges based on the NLRB’s
contention that certain postings, both with and without comments from others, were “concerted”),
with NLRB. Gen. Couns. Adv. Mem., Case No. 17-CA-25030 (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter WalMart Advice Memorandum] (advising the dismissal of charges because a post was not
“concerted,” despite the fact that the post garnered many comments and support from others and
seemed to be inducing group action).
16. See, e.g., David Gevertz & Gina Greenwood, Crafting an Effective Social Media Policy for
Healthcare Employers, 22 No. 6 HEALTH L. 28, 30–32 (2010) (describing how to draft effective
social media policies in the healthcare industry to prevent risks of employee inappropriateness on
social networking sites). See generally Kellen A. Hade, Not All Lawyers are Antisocial: Social
Media Regulation and the First Amendment, 2011 J. PROF. L. 133 (2011) (exploring social media
policies for attorneys).
17. See Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union in Traditional and Cyber
Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 827 (2003).
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carefully monitoring their employees’ social media use, and even worse, the
spiraling litigation costs that will result from wrongfully disciplining
employees. 18 On the other hand, employers want the discretion to make
employment decisions when employees disparage their co-workers or harm
the employers’ reputation through social media.19
This note argues that the NLRB misapplies old law to a new and
distinct context by broadly defining employees’ social media use as
“protected concerted activity” under Section 7 of the NLRA. Without clear
precedent from the NLRB on when social media activity is protected,
employers will face a dilemma when an employee complains via social
media: terminate the employee and live with the potential repercussions of
high litigation costs, or do nothing and hope it does not affect public
relations, productivity, or organizational culture. However, it is inevitable
that, in an effort to protect their reputation and corporate culture, some
employers will terminate employees for social media postings. These
corporations unfortunately have an unknown fate. In light of this problem,
Congress should take a proactive approach and amend the Act. Waiting for
tribunals to establish precedent on this issue will take years or even
decades, and the last thing employers and employees need in this economic
climate is uncertainty.20 An amendment to this part of the Act has not been
passed in over sixty years, and there is no better time than now. The
framework of the employer-employee relationship has been drastically
transformed since the 1930s and 1940s, when the Act was more properly
applied to the employment landscape.21 It is time for the Act to conform to
the current employment landscape and societal realities.
Part I discusses the Facebook Firing case and how the nature of the
Internet makes protecting employees’ social media activity different from
protecting face-to-face or pre-Internet activity. Part II looks into a few
18. See id.
19. See PETER J. PIZZI, WHERE CYBER

AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INTERSECT, RISKS FOR
MANAGEMENT ABOUND (West 2011), available at 2011 WL 3020563.
20. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently held that
President Obama’s recess appointments of three NLRB members was unconstitutional. Robert
Barnes & Steven Mufson, Court Says Obama Exceeded Authority in Making Appointments,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-says-obama-exceeded
-authority-in-making-appointments/2013/01/25/b7e1b692-6713-11e2-9e1b-07db1d2ccd5b_story
.html. Therefore, the decisions in which those NLRB members participated can potentially be
challenged. Id. This may cast doubt over recent NLRB decisions, including some social media
cases, and could “present a quandary for employers about how to comply with the law.” Id.
However, the effect of the D.C. Circuit’s holding is unknown because as the NLRB Chairman
stated, the holding only applies to that one case. Id. The NLRB will likely continue prosecuting
social media cases and the NLRB Chairman indicated that the NLRB will “continue business as
usual.” Id. The case may also reach the Supreme Court, which would further delay resolution of
this issue. Id. Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion advances the premise of this note that there is and
will be great uncertainty surrounding social media cases, and the NLRB will likely continue to
pursue such cases against employers.
21. See, e.g., infra Part I.C.
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social media cases that followed the Facebook Firing case and how they fail
to draw a clear line between social media activity that is protected and
activity that is not protected. Part III examines past NLRB precedent to
project how broadly the NLRB will define activity as “protected concerted
activity” in the coming years, and to what extent employee misconduct
warrants discipline without the employer fearing future litigation costs.
Lastly, Part IV recommends a solution to the negative consequences that
these social media cases have on employers. That solution is to amend the
NLRA. The NLRA is long overdue for modifications and the current
economic climate and transformation of the employer-employee
relationship make the time ripe for congressional proactivity.
I. HOW EMPLOYEES’ SOCIAL MEDIA ACTIVITY HAS A
GREATER EFFECT ON CORPORATIONS THAN FACE-TO-FACE
ACTIVITY
A. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The NLRA was established to protect America’s labor force, as a
reaction to minimal restrictions on employers and growing labor unrest.22
Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, guaranteeing employees certain rights,
including the right to organize and bargain collectively. 23 In order to
enforce the rights guaranteed by the NLRA, Section 3 of the NLRA
established the NLRB and its powers. 24 The NLRB has two branches:
judicial and prosecutorial.25 The judicial branch, referred to in this note as
the Board, is a group of five individuals based in Washington, D.C. who act
in a judicial capacity.26 They are appointed by the President to a five-year
term and are affirmed by the Senate. 27 The other branch is the General
Counsel, which is the prosecutorial side of the NLRB.28
The NLRB has offices across the country and is responsible for
investigating and prosecuting parties that engage in unfair labor practices.29
22. Description of National Labor Relations Act, IBEW LOCAL 1613,
http://home.earthlink.net/~local1613/nlra.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2011).
23. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1935), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act. “The provisions of the NLRA were later
expanded under the Taft-Hartley Labor Act of 1957 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.”
National Labor Relations Act (1935), OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc
.php?flash=false&doc=67 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 153.
25. See National Labor Relations Board, INC.COM, http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/national
-labor-relation-board-nlrb.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
26. Id.
27. See What We Do – Decide Cases, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/decide-cases
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
28. See National Labor Relations Board, supra note 25.
29. Id.
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This process begins when an employee, union, or employer files a “charge”
(a claim) with a Regional Office of the NLRB. 30 Then, after an
investigation, the NLRB decides whether to issue a complaint or dismiss
the charge.31 If the NLRB pursues the case, the case is brought before an
administrative law judge (ALJ), a neutral public official who decides
whether the accused party committed an unfair labor practice.32 The ALJ’s
decision can be appealed to the Board.33 Board decisions can be appealed to
an appropriate United States Court of Appeals, which can in turn be
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.34 The NLRB and the Board
were designed to be a neutral “referee,” favoring neither the employer nor
the employee.35
The purpose of the NLRB is to protect the rights of employees as
specified in the NLRA. 36 These rights are set forth in Section 7 of the
NLRA, which states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
8(a)(3).37

If employees’ rights have been violated, the NLRB can file an unfair
labor practice charge against the employer38 pursuant to Section 8 of the
NLRA.39 Specifically, Section 8(a)(1) protects employees’ Section 7 rights
30. See Meghan Brooke Phillips, Using the Employee Free Choice Act as Duct Tape: How
Both Active and Passive Deregulation of Labor Law Make the EFCA an Improper Mechanism for
Remedying Working Class Americans’ Problems, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 219, 238 (2008) (citation
omitted).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., id. (describing the process of charges filed with the NLRB); What We Do –
Decide Cases, supra note 27.
34. See What We Do – Decide Cases, supra note 27.
35. See id.; see also National Labor Relations Board, supra note 25.
36. OUR DOCUMENTS, http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=67 (last
visited Dec. 20, 2011).
37. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935), available at http://www.nlrb
.gov/national-labor-relations-act.
38. If an employee believes his or her rights have been violated by an employer or labor
organization, he or she can file a charge with the NLRB. See What We Do – Investigate Charges,
NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). Then
the NLRB will investigate the charge and determine whether it is valid and should be pursued. See
National Labor Relations Board, supra note 25. Before the NLRB issues a complaint, many
charges are withdrawn or settled. Id. If a complaint is filed, typically there is a full hearing before
an NLRB Administrative Law Judge, which is subject to review by the Board. See What We Do –
Decide Cases, supra note 27.
39. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
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by stating that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7.” 40 In social media cases, the NLRB typically
brings charges against the employer for violating Section 8(a)(1), which
protects union and nonunion employees.41
B. THE FACEBOOK FIRING CASE: STARTING A TREND
The Facebook Firing case was the first case in which the NLRB
determined that employees’ criticisms of their supervisors or employers on
social networking sites are protected activities under the NLRA. 42 The
NLRB filed a complaint against American Medical Response of
Connecticut for violating what it claimed was protected activity when an
employee was terminated for criticizing her supervisor on the employee’s
Facebook page.43 The employee used vulgarities in mocking her supervisor
on Facebook and referred to him as a “psychiatric patient.”44 This Facebook
post received comments by her co-workers who demonstrated their
support.45 The employee was later terminated.46
The NLRB believed the post was “protected concerted activity” under
Section 7 of the NLRA, and by terminating the employee for engaging in
such activity, the employer violated Section 8(a)(1).47 The NLRB argued
that the post was “concerted” because other co-workers commented on the
post and showed support, 48 and that this was “protected” because it
criticized a supervisor with respect to “wages, hours and working
conditions.”49 The NLRB and American Medical Response of Connecticut
eventually settled the claim.50 Commenting on the case, the director of the
NLRB’s Hartford office said, “You’re allowed to talk about your supervisor
with your co-workers. You’re allowed to communicate the concerns and
criticisms you have. The only difference in this case is she did it on
Facebook and did it on her own time using her own computer.”51 However,
there is a vast difference between face-to-face communication and
communication via social networking.
40. See id. § 158(a).
41. See, e.g., id. §§ 151–169; Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011);

Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges,
Sept. 2 2011); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges, Sept. 28, 2011); MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.
42. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12; Fitzpatrick, supra note 1.
43. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12.
44. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12.
45. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12.
46. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12.
47. See Greenhouse, supra note 8; Trottman, supra note 12.
48. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935); Greenhouse, supra note 8.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 157; Greenhouse, supra note 8.
50. Trottman, supra note 12.
51. Greenhouse, supra note 8.
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C. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROTECTING SOCIAL MEDIA
ACTIVITY AND FACE-TO-FACE ACTIVITY
Social media use in the employment context is particularly significant
because of the way the Internet’s distinctive characteristics changed the
nature of the workplace. 52 The Internet opens “a gateway to the outside
world—beyond the walls of the corporation—that has had, and will
continue to have, far-reaching effects.”53 Social media makes it easier for
employees to bring their workplace issues home with them and discuss such
issues with their co-workers,54 friends, or even complete strangers. Prior to
social media, discussing employment problems with co-workers was
possible through e-mail, the telephone, or old-fashioned face-to-face
communication. As social media becomes more popular, it appears that
more employees use social media as their major vehicle for
communication. 55 However, unlike the other forms of communication,
social media profiles are easily discovered and more publically accessible.56
Furthermore, employers are making greater efforts to monitor public posts
made on social media websites. 57 This is only part of the problem. In
addition to the employer, other “friends” including peers, competitors, the
media, and the general public can view what employees post if the
employee does not restrict his or her privacy settings 58 such that even
seemingly private social media conversations can end up reaching the
public.59 The other participant in the conversation, or another user that can

52. PATRICIA WALLACE, THE INTERNET IN THE WORKPLACE: HOW NEW TECHNOLOGY IS
TRANSFORMING WORK 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004).
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
55. See Elizabeth Lupfer, Communicate with Employees Through Social Media, THE SOCIAL
WORKPLACE (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.thesocialworkplace.com/2009/08/24/communicate
-with-employees-through-social-media/.
56. Sometimes an employee’s Facebook or Twitter page can be found with a simple Google
search of the person’s name. See Om Malik, Facebook Opens up to Public Search, GIGAOM (Sep.
5, 2007, 12:07 AM), http://gigaom.com/2007/09/05/facebook-open-to-public-search/.
57. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Keeping a Closer Eye on Employees’ Social Networking, N.Y.
TIMES BITS BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010, 6:51 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/keeping-a
-closer-eye-on-workers-social-networking/ (discussing Social Sentry, a company that “draws . . .
publicly posted information on Facebook and Twitter” when monitoring social media posts for
employers); Dionne Searcey, Employers Watching Workers Online Spurs Privacy Debate, WALL
ST. J., April 23, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124045009224646091.html (detailing
where an employer enters private chatroom and fires employees for the ensuing discussion).
58. See Shea Bennett, 10 Must-Learn Lessons for Twitter Newbies, ALL TWITTER (Aug. 6,
2012. 8:00 AM), http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/10-lessons-twitter-newbies_b10079.
59. “That’s the problem with social media. Once you start feeding it posts and images, users
can send them swirling just about anywhere. You might think you’re just talking to your friends,
but you don’t really control the conversation, which can take on a breadth and significance you
hadn’t intended.” Max Fisher, Why is Israel Tweeting Airstrikes?, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/israels-campaign-of-airstrikes-and-tweets/2012/11/16
/48b17eae-2f75-11e2-9f50-0308e1e75445_story.html (discussing how the Israeli Defense Force’s
tweets and Facebook posts have been re-posted and shared thousands of times).
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view the “private” conversation, can re-post it to his or her friends, who can
in turn re-post it to their friends, and so on.60 The large scale usage of the
Internet and social media amplifies the possible damage to a corporation
when employees comment about the workplace. 61 This makes a familiar
problem for a corporation—an employee disparaging his or her employer—
exponentially more harmful for the corporation because of the broad range
of entities that can view the postings.
The information posted on social media forums not only reaches a
broad range of people but could also be permanent, which creates a new
problem for employers. 62 For example, complaints on Facebook about a
supervisor may be forever traceable. 63 In contrast, when the NLRA was
passed in 1935, fewer people heard employee complaints to co-workers
about their supervisor, and such statements were probably not recorded at
all. This unavoidable characteristic of the Internet 64 further broadens
corporations’ exposure when employees take to social media to discuss
employment problems.
The sense of anonymity and guise that people feel when using the
Internet—justified or unjustified—may cause employees to feel more
comfortable using social media to air grievances.65 As opposed to speaking
to a co-worker at the place of employment, where a supervisor might be
listening, an employee sitting at home behind a computer may be more
likely to express his or her concerns. 66 Consequently, social media can
cause employees to discuss employment problems more frequently and
publically than ever before.
60. Id.
61. See,

e.g., Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www
.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (illustrating global internet usage
statistics); Mark Zuckerberg, One Billion People on Facebook, FACEBOOK (Oct. 4, 2012),
http://newsroom.fb.com/News/One-Billion-People-on-Facebook-1c9.aspx.
62. See Daniel K. Gelb, Privacy Invasions Last Forever, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011, 12:53
PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/30/cyberbullying-and-a-students-suicide
/privacy-invasions-now-last-forever (discussing the effects of cyber bullying, including the
permanence of information on the Internet); see also Sarah Hawk, The Internet is Forever,
SITEPOINT (May 17, 2012), http://www.sitepoint.com/the-internet-is-forever/ (explaining that
people have asked the blogger to delete their posts because the postings remain on the Internet and
could have devastating consequences in the future).
63. See Hawk, supra note 62.
64. See Gelb, supra note 62; Hawk, supra note 62.
65. See, e.g., Facebook’s Randi Zuckerberg: Anonymity Online ‘Has To Go Away,’
HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2011, 1:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/27/randi
-zuckerberg-anonymity-online_n_910892.html (calling for anonymity on the Internet to go away
so people can be held more accountable on social media forums such as Facebook). People often
would like to be anonymous on the Internet for various reasons; however, the “cloak of online
anonymity can easily be lifted.” John D. Sutter, The Coming-out Stories of Anonymous Bloggers,
CNN TECH (Aug. 21, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-08-21/tech/outing.anonymous.bloggers
_1_bloggers-online-anonymity-persona?_s=PM.
66. See Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union in Traditional and Cyber
Workplaces, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 827, 828–29 (2003) (explaining that the Internet gives employees
new ways to air their concerns).
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These fundamental aspects of the Internet and social media illustrate a
few important themes. First, the type of activity that the NLRA was
designed to protect in 1935—employees discussing employment issues—
has dramatically evolved into a more frequent and permanent phenomenon
that reaches an exponentially larger audience.67 Second, as long as social
media continues to dominate American culture, the problems associated
with social media use and employment will grow if they are not adequately
addressed.
II. THE NLRB’S APPLICATION OF OLD LAW TO SOCIAL
MEDIA ACTIVITY HAS CREATED UNCERTAINTY FOR
EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES AS TO WHEN SOCIAL MEDIA
ACTIVITY IS PROTECTED
A. THE NLRB BROADLY INTERPRETS “PROTECTED CONCERTED
ACTIVITY” AND FINDS EMPLOYEE CONDUCT ON SOCIAL MEDIA
PROTECTED UNDER THE NLRA
As technology has developed, people have found different ways to
communicate with each other.68 Social media platforms like Facebook and
Twitter are the newest, most popular methods of communication.69 In the
Facebook Firing case, the NLRB determined that certain communications
on Facebook are “protected concerted activity.” 70 Since that case, there
have been several similar cases involving employers disciplining or
terminating employees based on social media activity. 71 These cases
broadly define “protected concerted activity” and have inconsistent
outcomes, causing two major problems: (1) uncertainty for employers and
employees as to when social media activity is protected; and (2) adverse
consequences for employers who attempt to protect their corporation’s
reputation or organizational culture.
The NLRB has taken the position that Facebook posts that are
commented on by co-workers can be deemed a form of “concerted”
activity. 72 And the NLRB Division of Judges—the ALJs—agree with

67. See, e.g., Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 61 (illustrating the vast amount of internet
users); Zuckerberg, supra note 61; Gelb, supra note 62.
68. See WALLACE, supra note 52.
69. See, e.g., Key Facts, supra note 3; Bennett, supra note 4; see also Dugan, supra note 4.
70. See Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, supra note
10.
71. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011) (discussing how an
employer terminated his employee for commenting on co-workers’ Facebook pages about the
employer making late payments); Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL
3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452,
2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 28, 2011); see also MEMORANDUM OM 11-74,
supra note 13.
72. Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520, at *7–9.
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them.73 In Hispanics United, five employees of a nonprofit social services
provider were terminated for posting comments on Facebook. 74 The
terminations arose out of a domestic violence advocate’s conversation with
a co-worker about how she believed some employees of the nonprofit
corporation were underperforming. 75 The co-worker posted on Facebook
what the advocate told her and within a few hours, four employees had
responded with their feelings about their own job performances. 76 For
example, one employee said, “What the Hell, we don’t have a life as is,
What else can we do???” 77 Another said, “Tell her to come do mt[my]
f****** job n c if I don’t do enough, this is just dum.”78 The advocate saw
the posts and commented that the original post was a lie. 79 She later
complained about the incident to the Executive Director.80 The Executive
Director terminated all five employees because their comments constituted
“bullying and harassment” of the advocate. 81 The ALJ disagreed,
concluding that the nonprofit corporation interfered with the employees’
Section 7 rights in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA and ordered the
nonprofit corporation to reinstate the employees and make them whole for
their lost earnings and benefits, with interest.82
The ALJ applied Board precedent and held that the employees’ activity
was concerted.83 The ALJ cited the Meyers line of cases, which explains
that “concerted activities” protected by Section 7 are those “engaged in with
or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of
the employee himself.” 84 The ALJ stated that “the activities of a single
employee in enlisting support of fellow employees in mutual aid and
protection is as much concerted activity as is ordinary group activity.”85
Further, the ALJ held that “individual action is concerted so long as it is

73. Id.; see MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.
74. Id. at *6–7. It should be noted that the Board recently affirmed the ALJ’s decision in this
case. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2012). Specifically, the Board
“decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order.” Id.
75. Id. at *4, 6–7.
76. Id. at *4–5.
77. Id. at *5.
78. Id. (spelling error from “mt” to “my” was made in the decision, and the curse word
“f******” was censored in this note due to its inappropriateness, although spelled out fully in the
decision).
79. Id. at *6.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *9.
83. Id. at *7–9.
84. Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Meyers Indus. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B.
493 (1984), rev’d sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S.
948 (1985), on remand Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 U.S. 882 (1986), aff’d. sub nom. Prill v.
NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988)).
85. Id.
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engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing group action.”86 Since
the charging employee’s original Facebook post was an appeal to her coworkers for assistance, the activity was “concerted” under Section 7 of the
NLRA. 87 The employees’ postings were protected because they were
complaining about working conditions—comments by a co-worker about
their job performance.88
Lastly, the ALJ applied the Atlantic Steel test89 to determine whether
the employees forfeited their protection under the NLRA for engaging in
misconduct (here, cursing) during the course of their protected activity.90
The factors considered under the Atlantic Steel test are: “(1) the place of the
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the
employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way,
provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.” 91 Based on a broad
interpretation of the Atlantic Steel test, the ALJ—ignoring the curse words
and sarcastic undertones of the Facebook posts—determined that the
postsdid not constitute misconduct to the requisite level that would lose the
protection of the NLRA.92
The Hispanics United case indicates that ALJs and the Board will
squeeze social media cases into Board law that is several decades old.93 Its
broad reading of “concerted activity” will affect how corporations must deal
with their employees’ social media activities.94 An employer that is familiar
with Hispanics United might discipline or terminate an employee for
commenting on Facebook about job conditions if the comment did not
garner any responses. However, with the NLRB, the ALJs, and the Board
applying the Meyers line of cases to social media contexts, an individual
comment on Facebook “engaged with the object of . . . inducing group
action” would be considered “concerted activity.” 95 This is a problem
because despite the statements made by Lafe Solomon, the Acting General
Counsel of the NLRB who asserted that posting on Facebook is equivalent
to conversing at a “water cooler,”96 social media communication has glaring
differences from the traditional workplace communication.97 The popularity
86. Id. (citing Mushroom Trans. Co., 330 F.2d 683 (3d. Cir. 1964); Whittaker Corp., 289
N.L.R.B. 933 (1988)).
87. See MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.
88. Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520, at *8.
89. Id. at *8 (citing Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979)).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See generally id.
94. Id. at *6.
95. Id. at *5.; see also, Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 1, 16 (2012) (applying
Meyers to the social media context).
96. Edward G. Phillips, A Primer for Nonemployment Lawyers Advising Clients on the
NLRB’s Treatment of Social Media Cases, TENN. B.J. 30, 31 (2011).
97. Brustein, supra note 57.
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of social media and the anonymous guise of the Internet make employees’
comments on social media platforms more likely to garner responses from
others than they would if the statements were made privately or at the water
cooler. 98 Therefore, the NLRB will deem activity “concerted” more frequently than it has before, further exposing employers to litigation costs
arising from defending themselves against charges brought by the NLRB.
Furthermore, the broad access to social media platforms creates a public
image and reputation problem for corporations that “water cooler talk”
simply does not.99 In Bay SYS Technologies, a local newspaper published
Facebook posts made by one employee on other employees’ Facebook
pages about their employer making late payments to employees. 100 The
Board concluded that the complaints on co-workers’ Facebook pages were
protected concerted activity.101 After the newspaper published the Facebook
posts, the employer’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) learned about the
posts and emailed the employees, criticizing them for their actions. 102
Several days later, the employer terminated the employee who made the
Facebook posts.103 The Board held that the employer committed an unfair
labor practice by “interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.”104 The Board ordered the employer to cease and
desist 105 from discouraging the employees from engaging in protected
activity.106
This case illustrates the public exposure employers could have from
employee complaints via social media. Although it was possible before the
Internet and social media for employees to make public complaints,
employee gripes on social media platforms are inherently public due to the
expansive reach and popularity of Facebook and Twitter. For example,
media outlets, such as the local newspaper in Bay SYS Technologies, can
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Facebook’s Randi Zuckerberg: Anonymity Online ‘Has to Go Away,’ supra note 65.
Brustein, supra note 57.
Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28, 2 (2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

The remedies provided for under the NLRA are not as lucrative as the damages
available under some individual rights statutes and theories. The remedial provision in
the NLRA states that if the Board finds an unfair labor practice was committed, it “shall
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effect the policies of the
Act.”
William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old is
New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 277 n.89 (2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)).
106. Bay SYS Technologies, 357 N.L.R.B. at 3.
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gain access to Facebook and other social media forums.107 Therefore, social
media creates a higher likelihood that complaints about a corporation or
workplace discussions will “go viral” and reach an even broader audience,
exposing the employer to bad press and public relations.108
B. THE BOARD TAKES A STEP BACK AND FINDS THAT SOME SOCIAL
MEDIA POSTINGS ARE UNPROTECTED
Although the NLRB has shown a willingness and proclivity to pursue
social media cases against employers, the Board has given employers some
optimism that employees will not have free range when taking their
employment complaints to Facebook and other social media platforms.109
However, with such optimism comes uncertainty.110 In Karl Knauz Motors,
a BMW car dealership held an event to launch a new product and was
serving hotdogs, cookies, and chips at the event.111 At a meeting before the
event, some salespeople stated that they felt the food choice was
inappropriate for the type of brand they were trying to portray to their
customers.112 Also, some salespeople said that the BMW dealership should
be “doing more” for the event.113 The charging party, a salesman for the
BMW dealership, later testified that he and his co-workers were concerned
that the low quality of food would reflect poorly on the product, customers
would be less satisfied, and the salespeople would receive lower
commissions.114 The charging party took pictures of the event and mocked
it on Facebook with a few comments. 115 A few days later, a different
salesman at the Land Rover dealership next to the BMW dealership, both
owned by the employer in the case, allowed a thirteen-year-old boy to sit in
the driver’s seat, which led to the boy driving the car over his father’s foot
and into a pond. 116 From the BMW dealership, where he could see the
incident, the charging party took pictures of the car in the pond and posted
them on Facebook.117 Several co-workers commented on these pictures as
well.118 Later, the charging party was terminated.119
107. See id. at 2.
108. See, e.g., Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 61; Key Facts, supra note 3; BETTER
BLOGGING FOR BLOGGERS, http://www.betterbloggingforbloggers.com/2010/05/how-to-make
-blog-post-go-viral-in.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
109. See Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges, Sept. 28, 2011).
110. See id.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *3–4.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *5.
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The ALJ held that the posts about the BMW event were “concerted”
activity because co-workers had previously discussed the issue at a
meeting. 120 They were “protected” because the event potentially affected
the salesman’s commission (“a condition of employment”).121 Although the
employee posted the photos and comments himself, without other
salespeople’s comments or input, the ALJ found that his posts were “clearly
concerted” because “he was vocalizing the sentiments of his co-workers and
continuing the course of concerted activity that began when the salespeople
raised their concerns at the staff meeting.”122 However, the ALJ held that
the postings about the car accident were not concerted or protected because
they were not on behalf of other co-workers or regarding the salesman’s
employment conditions. 123 Thus, the ALJ held that the termination was
lawful because it was only based on the postings about the car, rather than
the protected postings about the BMW event.124
A year later, the Board ruled on this case and affirmed the ALJ’s
decision.125 The Board held that the discharge was lawful because it was
based solely on the employee’s posts concerning the car accident, which
were not protected.126 But the Board also found it “unnecessary to pass on
whether the [salesman’s] Facebook posts concerning a marketing event at
the Respondent’s BMW dealership were protected.”127 This decision may
further complicate the legal landscape surrounding social media postings. It
is unlikely that the Board will dissuade the NLRB from pursuing such
claims against employers, but the Board has refused to add precedent on
this issue, creating greater uncertainty about whether posts such as the
salesman’s in Karl Knauz Motors will garner protection.
Additionally, Karl Knauz Motors demonstrates that ALJs (and maybe
the Board) are willing to draw the line somewhere between what is
concerted activity and what is not, but where that line falls in the social
media context is unclear.128 Like many of the other social media cases, the
ALJ applied Meyers and its progeny to the facts of the case to determine
whether the activity was concerted. 129 Yet, it may not be clear to an
employer whether social media postings by employees “seek to initiate or to
induce or to prepare for group action” (protected), or whether they are

120. Id. at *8.
121. Id. (discussing the issue indicated “concerted” activity, and the fact that because it could
affect commission indicated that it was “protected” activity since it has to do with wages, a term
and condition of employment).
122. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.
123. Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437, at *9.
124. Id.
125. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2012).
126. Id. at 1 n.1.
127. Id. at 1.
128. Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437, at *9.
129. See id.
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“solely by and on behalf of the employee himself” (not protected). 130 It
appears that comments by co-workers indicate concerted action, but the
photos and comments about the car accident in Karl Knauz Motors were not
concerted, despite co-workers posting comments on the pictures. 131
Therefore, the standard in these social media cases is clear, but its
application is not.
The NLRB has dismissed some cases because it determined that certain
“individual griping” is not concerted activity, thus drawing a line—however
unclear—between social media postings that are concerted and that are not
concerted. 132 In one case, a Wal-Mart employee was disciplined for
complaining about Wal-Mart management on Facebook.133 The posts said,
“Wuck Falmart! I swear if this tyranny doesn’t end in this store they are
about to get a wakeup call because lots are about to quit!” 134 The post
elicited a few “hang in there” type responses from co-workers, whom
accounted for a majority of the employee’s “Facebook friends.” 135 The
NLRB dismissed the charge because the post was an “individual gripe” and
the co-workers’ comments suggested that the original post was a “plea for
emotional support.”136 However, it is understandable for an employer in this
situation to believe that the NLRB may consider a post constitutes
“concerted activity” if it states that “lots [of employees are] about to
quit.”137 Such a statement seems to be inducing group action. Somehow a
“plea for emotional support”138 is different from “enlisting support of fellow
employees in mutual aid and protection.”139 The NLRB again attempted to
draw a line—using the Meyers standard—where social media conduct is not
concerted.140

130. Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General
Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1716–17 (1989).
131. See Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437, at *9.
132. In one case, a restaurant and bar had a corporate policy that waitresses do not share tips
with bartenders and two bartenders spoke about how the policy was unfair. See JT’s Porch Saloon,
No. 13-CA-46689, 2011 WL 2960964 (N.L.R.B.G.C., July 7, 2011). Months later, one of the
bartenders was terminated for complaining on Facebook about the policy and bashing the
employer’s customers as “rednecks.” Id. at *1–2. The bartender was terminated and there was no
violation of the NLRA because the bartender was not attempting to induce group action, was not
conversing with another co-worker, and the post did not arise from the conversation with the cobartender months before. Id. at *2–3. In another case, an employee made “insensitive comments
about the employer’s clientele,” which was not concerted because it was not to a co-worker. See
Martin House, No. 34-CA-12950, 2011 WL 3223853 (N.L.R.B.G.C. July 19, 2011).
133. See Wal-Mart Advice Memorandum, supra note 15.
134. See id. at 1.
135. See id. at 2.
136. See id. at 3.
137. Id. at 1.
138. Id.
139. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520, at *7 (N.L.R.B.
Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011).
140. See Wal-Mart Advice Memorandum, supra note 15, at 3.
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The problem with the NLRB’s handling of these cases is twofold: (1)
the application of Meyers to social media postings gives employees and
employers little guidance on when social media activity is concerted;141 and
(2) broadly defining “protected concerted activity” is inappropriate in a
social media context where the impact that employee complaints have on
corporations is significantly greater than in face-to-face contexts. 142
Therefore, corporations’ exposure in social media litigation is increased
exponentially due to the large, seemingly anonymous, and permanent nature
of the Internet and social media. 143 Nonetheless, the NLRB has broadly
defined “protected concerted activity” and applied it to the social media
context.144 This broad application of Meyers to these cases, along with the
few cases where social media posts were solely “individual activity,” fails
to assist employees or their employers in determining when activity is
“concerted.”145 Corporations also will want to know when an employee’s
social media activity is so reprehensible that the conduct will not be
protected by the Act. This will allow corporations to make employment
decisions as they feel appropriate in their business judgment, without fear
of defending themselves against the NLRB.
III. THE BOARD WILL CONTINUE TO BROADLY MISAPPLY
OLD LAW TO THE SOCIAL MEDIA CONTEXT WHEN
EMPLOYEES POST COMMENTS THAT ARE DISLOYAL,
DEFAMATORY, OR DISPARAGE THE EMPLOYER OR ITS
EMPLOYEES
Along with the uncertainty surrounding whether social media postings
are concerted, the NLRB has not given any indication when social media
postings will rise to a level of misconduct so reprehensible so as to lose
protection under the NLRA. The NLRB has indicated through its charges
filed against employers that it will rarely conclude that an employee who
would have otherwise engaged in protected concerted activity will lose that

141. Compare Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div.
of Judges, Sept. 28, 2011) (pertaining to an NLRB pursued claim where an employee was
discharged for posting comments criticizing his employer on Facebook), with Wal-Mart Advice
Memorandum, supra note 15. (dismissing an employee’s charge against an employer who
terminated the employee after he criticized his employer on Facebook).
142. See, e.g., Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 61; Key Facts, supra note 3.
143. See Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 61.
144. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011); Hispanics United of
Buffalo, Inc., 2011 WL 3894520; Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 2011 WL 4499437; MEMORANDUM
OM 11-74, supra note 13.
145. Compare Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437 (finding an employee’s posts on
Facebook as “concerted”), with Wal-Mart Advice Memorandum, supra note 15 (dismissing a
claim because the employee’s Facebook post was solely individual action).
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protection due to misconduct.146 Even arguably distasteful and disparaging
statements about supervisors or the corporation will maintain protection.147
But how far can employees’ statements go without forfeiting protection?
When can an employer terminate an employee for hurting the corporation’s
public image on the Internet, or disturbing employer-employee relationships
and organizational culture?
A. EMPLOYER ALLEGATIONS OF EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT OR
DEFAMATION IN SOCIAL MEDIA POSTINGS WILL RARELY LOSE
PROTECTION OF THE NLRA
1. The Atlantic Steel Test
The NLRB has not made it clear when it will be safe for corporations to
make employment decisions without facing potential liability under the
NLRA.148 Despite its reluctance to forfeit an employee’s protection under
the NLRA, the NLRB has shown that it will apply Atlantic Steel to
determine whether social media postings will lose that protection.149 In one
case, a sports bar and restaurant discharged two employees for a
conversation about the employer’s tax withholding practices when one of
the employees said the employer was “such an asshole.”150 It was apparent
that the employees’ comments were “concerted” under the Meyers cases
since they were made by co-workers sharing “group complaints” and that
they were “protected” because income tax withholdings are “terms and
conditions of employment.” 151 However, an employer would most likely
expect these statements to lose protection due to their distasteful, disloyal,
or defamatory nature.152 The bar owner conveyed this expectation by having
its attorney send a letter to one of the charging parties stating that “legal
action would be initiated against her unless she retracted her ‘defamatory’
statements regarding the Employer and its principals published to the
general public on Facebook.”153
The NLRB found that the employee’s statements did not lose protection
under the Atlantic Steel test. The factors considered under the Atlantic Steel
test are “(1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the
146. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, 357 N.L.R.B. 28; Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL
3894520; Karl Knauz Motors, 2011 WL 4499437; MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13; see
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/news/settlement-reached-case-involving-discharge-facebook
-comments (last visited Dec. 20, 2011); Trottman, supra note 12.
147. See MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13.
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520; MEMORANDUM OM 11-74,
supra note 13.
150. MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13, at 10.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 9.
153. Id. at 10.
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discussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the
outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor
practice.”154 The statements did not lose protection because the comments
were made outside of the workplace while the employee was off-duty, they
did not disrupt operations or undermine supervisory authority, and the
nature of the postings were “much less offensive than other behavior found
protected by the Board.”155 Additionally, the NLRB stated that to prove the
employee defamed the employer, which would cause the statements to lose
their protected status, the statements must not only be false, but maliciously
false. 156 Furthermore, not only did the NLRB find that the employer’s
allegations of defamation were unfounded, but the threat to sue violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 157 In this case, the employer may have been
better off if it had actually sued for defamation—“The Board has
historically distinguished the threat of a lawsuit from the actual filing of a
lawsuit and has rejected employers’ attempts to extend the First
Amendment protection accorded to lawsuits to threats to sue where those
threats, as here, were not incidental to the actual filing of a suit.”158 This
case demonstrates that when an employee’s social media postings appear to
disparage the corporation or supervisors of that corporation, those
statements may still be protected and that threatening to sue is not a good
idea if the threat is not incidental to actually filing the suit.159
Thus far in social media cases, the NLRB has been reluctant to apply
Atlantic Steel in a manner that forfeits employees’ rights under the
NLRA.160 An employee loses the protection of the NLRA if the activity is
“maliciously false” or “opprobrious” under the Atlanta Steel test. 161 This
test heavily favors employees, as is exhibited by the NLRB’s position that
the Act protects an employee’s statements calling a supervisor a
“scumbag” 162 or an employer’s owner “an asshole” 163 on social media
platforms.164 Thus, it appears as though inflammatory language on social
media postings will not lose protection.165 Social media postings critical of

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979)
MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13, at 9.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13, at 10–11; Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., No.
3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011).
161. Phillips, supra note 96, at 31 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted);
MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, supra note 13, at 11.
162. Phillips, supra note 96, at 31 (citations omitted).
163. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Id.
165. An employee was fired for calling the owner of the company that employed him an “F’ing
mother F’ing,” an “F’ing crook,” and “an asshole,” and that he was stupid, nobody liked him, and
everyone talked about him behind his back. Plaza Auto Ctr. Inc. and Nick Aguirre, 355 N.L.R.B.
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an employer already cause increased damage to those employers based on
the inherent characteristics of the Internet—mainly the public access,
seeming anonymity, and permanence.166 Protecting inflammatory postings
will only further expose and damage corporations’ reputations and
organizational morale. Inflammatory language will more likely catch
peoples’ eyes on social media, or “go viral,” and give the corporation bad
publicity. 167 Inflammatory comments about the employer or a supervisor
will also more likely cause schisms at the workplace between the employee
and management, particularly if the comments are made about a particular
manager or supervisor.
2. The Defamation Defense
Employers will often file a defamation lawsuit against the disciplined
employee as a back-up plan in case the Board finds that the disciplined
employee’s statements were protected under the NLRA.168 Employers may
attempt to do so as a power tactic to scare the employee from attempting to
defend itself against a defamation claim and cause them to withdraw their
charge with the NLRB. 169 Or, the employer may genuinely believe it is
being defamed. 170 Employers will be unpleasantly surprised when the
NLRB decides to apply the heightened “defamation defense” standard to
social media cases, as it does to other NLRA labor dispute cases.171
In NLRA labor disputes, courts apply a heightened standard that
requires a defamation plaintiff (the corporation-employer in this context) to
show that a defendant’s statements were “a deliberate or reckless untruth”
and that the statements caused actual harm.172 This differs from the usual
state law defamation standard that only requires the plaintiff to show that
“the defendant was negligent in making his or her untruthful statements to a
third party and does not require demonstrable proof that the statements led
to actual harm.”173 In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, the
Supreme Court of the United States further stated that in labor disputes,
85, 85–86 (2010). The NLRB held that such language was not sufficient to lose protection. Id.; see
also Phillips, supra note 96, at 31.
166. See, e.g., Brustein, supra note 57; Gelb, supra note 62 (discussing the effects of cyber
bullying, including the permanence of information on the internet).
167. See Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011).
168. See Kati L. Griffith, The NLRA Defamation Defense: Doomed Dinosaur or Diamond in the
Rough?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2009) (stating that employer defamation suits against
employee or worker organizations are on the rise).
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id. at 4.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 12 (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63–65
(1966)). See Veeder-Root Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1978) (finding that employee literature did not
lose the protection of the NLRA because it was false, misleading or inaccurate, since the
statements were not deliberately or maliciously false).
173. See Griffith, supra note 168, at 12–13.

188

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

“[T]he most repulsive speech enjoys immunity [from defamation liability]
provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth.” 174 But even
deliberate or reckless falsities are not actionable defamation claims “unless
the defamation plaintiff can also prove that these untruths led to actual
damages.” 175 Due to the Supremacy Clause, this federal NLRA standard
preempts state defamation laws, thus requiring employer defamation claims
to meet this heightened standard.176 The Supreme Court’s rationale for this
standard is that allowing states to regulate allegedly defamatory statements
during a labor dispute would “dampen the ardor of labor debate and
truncate the free discussion envisioned by the [NLRA].”177 “The Court also
sought to decrease the likelihood that defamation suits, which sometimes
lead to ‘excessive damages,’ would be ‘used as weapons of economic
coercion.’”178
The Board will likely adopt this standard for defamation claims that
arise out of social media postings. Facing this mountainous standard,
employers will be unlikely to succeed on a defamation claim and, therefore,
should think twice (or three times) before terminating or disciplining an
employee for what it believes are defamatory social media postings.
B. DISLOYAL AND DISPARAGING COMMENTS ABOUT AN EMPLOYER
WILL ALSO RARELY LOSE PROTECTION OF THE NLRA
The Board will likely adopt the Jefferson Standard approach when
handling social media cases where an employee allegedly disparages the
employer. Jefferson Standard attempted to distinguish terminations that
were unfair labor practices from those that were “for cause.” 179 If the
termination is for “insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty,” the
employer has adequate cause for discharge. 180 The employee will not be
protected if his or her comments amount to an “attack” on the corporation
or “the quality of the company’s product and its business policies, in a
manner reasonably calculated to harm the company’s reputation and reduce
its income.” 181 There are several factors that the Board and courts have
traditionally relied upon to remove speech from NLRA protection:
How closely connected employee comments are to actual labor disputes;
the timing of the organizational comments (i.e., the more “critical” a time
for the employer with regards to their relationship with the marketplace,

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966).
Griffith, supra note 168, at 13 (citing Linn, 383 U.S. at 63–65).
See id. at 7–8.
Id. at 11 (quoting Linn, 383 U.S. at 64).
Id.
NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers (Jefferson Standard), 346
U.S. 464, 472 (1953) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)).
180. Id. at 474.
181. Id. at 471.
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the more likely the speech will be deemed disloyal); the general tone
(overly harsh, critical, attacking, etc.); the employee’s general motive; and
the intended audience (the employer’s clients or customers, the general
public, or other employees).182

Although the Board will likely apply this standard to social media
cases,183 the problem again lies in the uncertainty of its application. As one
commentator put it, “[B]ased on the body of case law decided in the years
since Jefferson Standard, it is difficult to ascertain what, exactly, amounts
to the type of disloyalty that will subject employees’ otherwise protected
organizational speech to discipline.” 184 And that ambiguous body of law
does not yet include social media cases. In social media, disparaging
comments will have amplified consequences for employers due to the large
scale, sense of anonymity, and permanent nature of the Internet and social
media platforms.185 Due to the Board’s history of taking an ad hoc, factspecific approach to determining whether employees’ statements reach the
level of disparagement,186 it is likely that it will continue to do so in the
social media context. This illustrates the obvious problem of uncertainty for
both employees and employers as to when social media postings will lose
or maintain protection. It is the employers’ and employees’ best guess as to
how the Board will apply Jefferson Standard to the facts surrounding a
disciplinary action.
IV. AMENDING THE NLRA WILL MAKE THE NLRB MORE
EQUIPPED TO HANDLE SOCIAL MEDIA CASES AND
MITIGATE THE UNCERTAINTY THAT CURRENTLY EXISTS
FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
There are several problems with the NLRA and its inability to keep up
with the economic and societal realities of today.187 One of those realities is
that activity on the Internet is invariably different from non-Internet
communication. 188 Yet, the NLRB continues to apply old law to new
contexts that it was not created to deal with. 189 In applying Section 7

182. Andrew F. Hettinga, Expanding NLRA Protection of Employee Organizational Blogs:
Non-Discriminatory Access and the Forum-Based Disloyalty Exception, 82 CHI. KENT L. REV.
997, 1021 (2007).
183. See generally Endicott Interconnect Technologies, Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (finding that employee lost protection for disparaging his employer on the Internet).
184. Hettinga, supra note 182, at 1016.
185. See id. at 998–999; Gelb, supra note 62 (stating that “information can remain searchable
and retrievable, potentially forever”).
186. See Hettinga, supra note 182 at 1015–18.
187. See Phillips, supra note 30, at 221–23.
188. See WALLACE, supra note 52, at 3–4.
189. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011); Hispanics United of
Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 2 2011); Karl
Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 28,
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protection to social media postings, the NLRB has failed to consider the
drastic effects such protection could have on an employer, who can be
publically criticized—often harshly—without discretion to remedy the
situation.190 Instead, based on the scant guidance that the NLRB, the ALJs,
and the Board have given through the social media cases,191 employees will
not know what postings will be protected by the NLRA, and employers will
not know when they can discipline employees without fearing litigation
costs. Therefore, measures must be taken to (1) account for the harsh results
these cases may have on employers, and (2) mitigate some of the
uncertainty for both employers and employees.
A. CODIFY THE LAW REGARDING PROTECTED CONCERTED
ACTIVITY AND SPECIFY WHEN EMPLOYEES WILL LOSE
PROTECTION OF THE NLRA
Congress and state legislatures will often codify the common law that
develops in a particular area where courts have grappled with a legal
issue.192 To mitigate the uncertainty of what constitutes protected concerted
activity in social media, Congress should amend the NLRA and codify the
type of Internet activity and communication that will constitute concerted
activity. The old adage of allowing laws to apply in all contexts irrespective
of technological change may have some legitimacy when technology
changes so rapidly that the law simply cannot keep up with it. 193 Or,
applying old law may work if the old technology is similar enough to the
new technology.194 However, since it appears that the Internet is here to stay
and is vastly different from its predecessor technologies, establishing labor
laws that conform to today’s era of Internet communication is vital.
Congress has successfully passed statutes to deal specifically with Internet
activity in other areas,195 thus, there is no reason why labor-management
issues should be any different.
Congress should look at the types of social media cases (and other
Internet cases) and pass a statute specifying when postings are concerted.
Congress can define “concerted” activity along with explanatory comments
that give examples of Internet and pre-Internet activity that is both
2011); Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, supra note 10;
Trottman, supra note 12.
190. See supra note 189.
191. See supra note 189.
192. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J.
341, 350 (2010).
193. Rebecca J. Rosen, The Thorny Combination of Old Laws and New Tech, THE ATLANTIC,
Nov. 10, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/11/the-thorny-combination
-of-old-laws-and-new-tech/248111/#.
194. Id.
195. Congress passed laws for sexual predation on the Internet. See NET SAFE KIDS, http://www
.nap.edu/netsafekids/pp_li_il.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
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“concerted” and not “concerted.” Granted, unexpected disputes will arise
that do not seamlessly fit into the definition or the comments and the Board
will be left to determine how to categorize such unexpected activity. But,
employment disputes tend to repeat themselves, as they did in Hispanics
United, the Facebook Firing case, Karl Knauz Motors, and Bay SYS
Technologies, 196 and Congress can eliminate uncertainty in a majority of
these disputes by codifying where the law will stand in these foreseeable
situations. As a result, employees will know when they can air their feelings
on social media, blogs, or in an e-mail without fear of adverse action being
taken against them. Similarly, employers will know when they can
discipline an employee for potentially harmful comments made via social
media.
Further, Congress should codify when employees may lose protection
under the NLRA. Given the characteristics of the Internet—public access,
sense of anonymity, permanence—Congress may decide to create limited
carve-outs from NLRA protection for otherwise protected speech when it is
made through social media (or, for that matter, any publically-accessible
Internet posts). For instance, a post may lose protection if it is likely to have
a significantly more harmful effect on employers than the same non-Internet
speech would have had. Or, Congress may set a level of egregiousness
(high or low) where social media posts lose NLRA protection. Congress
may alternatively set a standard that a social media post will lose protection
if a reasonable employee should know that the comments are likely to cause
substantial harm to his or her employer. These proposed legislative changes
take into account the realities of the Internet and social media era that we
live in.
Additionally, the NLRA “was initially conceived of as the free market
solution to market failures in individual bargaining” and was created to deal
with the “‘inequality of bargaining power’ between generally weakerpositioned employees and generally stronger-positioned employers, and
protecting commerce by guaranteeing employees the right to ‘organize and
bargain collectively.’”197 Since even the employees who complain via social
media, like in the Facebook Firing case or Hispanics United, are not likely
exercising their right to organize or collectively bargain, there is less reason
to protect those posts when they greatly harm employers. 198 Therefore,
196. See, e.g., Bay SYS Technologies, LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. 28 (2011); Hispanics United of
Buffalo, Inc., No. 3-CA-27872, 2011 WL 3894520 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept 2, 2011); Karl
Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges, Sept. 28,
2011); Settlement Reached in Case Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, supra note 10;
Trottman, supra note 12.
197. Phillips, supra note 30, at 226 (quoting Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational
Theory of Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 58 (2007))
(also quoting National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449–50 (1935)). .
198. See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, 2011 WL 3894520; Settlement Reached in Case
Involving Discharge for Facebook Comments, supra note 10; Trottman, supra note 12.
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Congress should enact some measures to alleviate the harm to employers
caused by employees’ social media gripes, while at the same time
protecting the principles of the NLRA that guard employees’ right to
organize. However, even if Congress simply codifies Jefferson Standard or
Atlantic Steel, it would do a great service to employers and employees by
mitigating uncertainty regarding future social media cases.199
B. TRIPARTITE NATIONAL BODY WITH REGIONAL BOARDS AND
REDUCED SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A tripartite national body with regional boards would be a structure
where each region had its own board with three members—one representing
employers, one representing workers, and one neutral.200 This structure will
ensure that “each party will have its case presented and understood before a
sympathetic board member who understands that party’s day-to-day
concerns.” 201 Such a structure would mimic the War Labor Board and
Canadian Board202—it would replace the ALJs and the Regional Board’s
adjudications could similarly be appealed to the National Board as it
currently exists.203 This tripartite system would “increase the likelihood that
the practical problems and concerns of both parties are addressed in
addition to legal issues.” 204 The Regional Board’s decision is also more
likely to be accepted by the losing party since it will have had an
adjudicator that is aligned with its interests hear the case.205 Further, having
a regionalized Board will facilitate the parties to “bring about voluntary
resolution of the dispute, or if necessary, bring the Board decisions closer to
the parties.”206
Moreover, the scope of judicial review of National Board decisions
should be reduced.207 “Board decisions would be reversed or remanded only
if the Board denied the complainant due process, exceeded its jurisdiction,
or violated the NLRA.” 208 This will avoid the administrative delays
experienced under the current Board and would also serve to limit frivolous
appeals,209 enabling Board precedent on new issues, such as social media
cases, to be developed more speedily. The tripartite system would also give
newfound confidence in precedent in this area, because the cases will have
199. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464,
472 (1953); Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979).
200. See Richard N. Block, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Act and Zero-Sum Labor
Law: An Industrial Relations View, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 30, 46–47 (1997).
201. Id. at 47.
202. See id. at 46–47.
203. See id. at 50–51.
204. Id. at 51.
205. See id. at 48.
206. Id. at 51.
207. See id. at 52.
208. Id.
209. See id.
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been decided by experts in the field that represent the interests and concerns
of both employees and employers.210 Rather than applying old law to the
new and distinct social media context, the Regional Boards can develop
case law to fit the economic and societal realities, while still maintaining
the original purpose of the Act.
A tripartite Regional Board will help solve both problems of
uncertainty and backlash against employers. Even if Congress refuses to
codify the Board common law into the NLRA, Board precedent in this new
area of the law will develop rapidly under this tripartite structure with
reduced judicial review and fewer appeals.211 The Regional Board will be
close to the parties, have great expertise in the field, and have one member
essentially representing the interests of each party, eliciting greater trust in
the common law developed surrounding the issue.212 Therefore, parties will
be comfortable in relying on the established precedent in social media
cases—employers will know when social media activity can be
reprimanded and employees will know when they can air their grievances
via social media.
C. EXPAND BOARD REMEDIES
Congress should also expand the Board’s remedial powers in an effort
to avoid potential negative implications on union organizing. Currently, the
Board’s remedial powers—proscribed in Section 10 of the NLRA—are
relatively limited. 213 The Board’s typical remedy is a cease-and-desist
order,214 which is essentially a slap on the wrist. The Board also has the
power to order a “make whole” remedy, which could require an employer
to reinstate and award back pay to an unlawfully-discharged employee.215
Although it is unlikely that many of the social media cases have
involved or will involve employees attempting to organize, it is possible
that social media will be used to facilitate union organizing.216 And that
should not be thwarted. The recommended changes in this note are
designed to solve the problem of applying old Board precedent to a new
setting involving social media communication. Those changes align with—
and should not hamper—the intent of the Act to protect employees who
organize to take lawful group action. The NLRA has an expressed interest
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 50–51.
See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to
Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 431 (1992); Phillips, supra note 30, at 238.
214. See Craver, supra note 213, at 431–33; see also Phillips, supra note 30, at 266–68.
215. See Craver, supra note 213, at 432.
216. E.g., Bargaining Update by Update, THE DAILY DOT (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.dailydot
.com/news/labor-unions-twitter-facebook-negotiations-uaw/; see Marissa Oberlander, An Unlikely
Union: Social Media and Labor Relations, MEDILL REPORTS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://news.medill
.northwestern.edu/chicago/news.aspx?id=176075.
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in protecting labor organizing. 217 Thus, when the Regional Board or
National Board recognizes a social media case where such organization is
clearly taking place, the NLRB should issue a mandatory injunction to
prevent the employer from impeding the employees’ collective action.
Despite Section 10(j) of the Act, which grants the Board the power to issue
an injunction, the NLRB “rarely seeks preliminary relief against employer
unfair labor practices under Section 10(j).” 218 That problem would be
solved if, in such situations, the NLRB is statutorily obliged to seek an
immediate injunction to have the employer immediately reinstate the
discharged employee.
Furthermore, the Board should have harsher remedies at its disposal,
such as fines, sanctions, and double back-pay awards for unlawfully
discharged employees. This will protect employees’ Section 7 rights when
they are actually being violated, and at the same time protect employers
from litigations expenses when their employees are not actually exercising
their organizational rights protected by the NLRA.
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to demonstrate that the NLRB’s
characterization of social media activity as “protected concerted activity”
under the NLRA has created uncertainty for employers and employees, and
does not consider the potentially grave consequences that broadly
protecting this activity could have on employers. The differences between
social media and face-to-face or pre-Internet communication— mainly
public access to social media sites, guise of anonymity on the Internet, and
the permanent nature of Internet postings—are the reasons why an
application of old law to new contexts has undesirable results. The most
viable solution to this problem is to amend the NLRA, which is antiquated
and unequipped to deal with current societal and economic realities, to
codify with explanatory comments when activity is “concerted” and when
otherwise protected activity loses protection in the pre-Internet and Internet
contexts, to create a tripartite system with a national board and regional
boards, and to expand Board remedies to protect conduct that truly violates
employees’ Section 7 rights under the Act.
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